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THE MINIMUM ASSUMED INCENTIVE EFFECT 
OF EXECUTIVE SHARE OPTIONS
ABSTRACT
In granting executive share options (ESOs), companies hand over financial assets to the
executive at an opportunity cost that generally outweighs the value placed on those assets
by the executive on the receiving end.  This outcome can be explained by risk aversion
on the part of the executives.  For such transactions to make commercial sense, the
difference in valuation must be at least made up by the impact of the incentive effects
induced by compensating executives in this particular manner.  This paper extends such a
line of analysis to examine the executive’s reward-risk trade-off, in addition to the
certainty-equivalent pay-performance sensitivity, and uses a UK data set to provide some
estimates of the size of these effects.
JEL Classification: J33 and M14.
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1. Introduction
Some commentators have been puzzled as companies load up the remuneration packages
of their executives with executive share options (ESOs) and other long-term company-
specific equity instruments.  From one perspective, such behaviour can be explained as a
device for improving reported earnings, in the sense that in many accounting jurisdictions
(the UK and the USA, for example) there has been no obligation on the company to
expense such components of remuneration by recording them on the expenditure side of
the income statement.
 
The behaviour appears odd, of course, because the executive on the receiving end of this
form of remuneration generally values such equity-based components of pay at less than
the opportunity cost to the company awarding them.  This is due to risk aversion on the
part of executives who, in addition to having specific human capital investments in a
company, may already hold part of their wealth in the form of company-specific equity.
In terms of straight remuneration, a Pareto improvement, therefore, appears to go
begging, in the sense that the company could provide the executive with a cash payment
that not only is preferred by the executive to the ESOs it replaces, but also costs the
company less.  The company appears to choose an expensive way of remunerating its
senior executives.
A more robust explanation of the widespread use of ESOs and their apparent excess cost
can be found in terms of managerial incentives.  Consider a company that grants to an
executive a package of ESOs that would otherwise (on the open market) be valued at
£300,000.  Suppose that this executive already has much of his or her human capital tied
up in the firm and also has existing savings in the form of company shares or earlier
tranches of ESOs.  Any risk aversion on the part of the executive will, therefore, cause
the executive to discount in valuation the most recent package of ESOs to an extent that it
may have a certainty-equivalent (cash) value well below the £300,000 opportunity cost to
the company.   However, the fact that remuneration is hereby delivered in a deferred
mode that is contingent on company performance may well result in an improved
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alignment in managerial incentives and, consequently, an increase in company
performance.  This increase in company performance may lead to an enhancement in
company valuation that is assumed to be at least equal to any such excess cost of the ESO
package to the shareholders, so making ESOs a technique of remunerating executives
favoured by shareholders.  We call this assumed increase in company valuation the
minimum assumed incentive (MAI) effect.
This paper attempts to quantify the size of this MAI effect of executive share options
(ESOs) by calculating how much the market value of the ESO component of pay exceeds
the value of that component to the executive.  In so doing, we draw on the Lambert,
Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002) model of  the valuation of
ESO grants.  We both illustrate some of their results (in, for example, Figure 1) and
extend the model (in, for example, Figures 2 and 4) to compare executive attitudes to risk
both with and without a share option component in the pay package.  Thus, the paper
addresses the question of incentives for executives more directly than an extensive
literature (see Murphy, 1999) that considers their evaluation only in terms of the ex-post
association between company share price performance and the cost of executive rewards
to the firm.  This conventional approach assumes that rewards are influenced by
performance.  However, this paper focuses on the incentive effects of executive rewards,
where rewards are assumed to influence performance.
Besides inducing managers to supply shareholder-aligned effort, a deeper agency
problem is how to provide incentives for managers to promote shareholder value under
inefficient risk-sharing (Holmstrom, 1992).  If the main purpose of a compensation
system is to align managerial interests with shareholders’ objectives, then this must also
include aligning their risk preferences (Murphy, 1999), and substantial efforts are made
to design complex executive contracts that address such issues (Kole, 1997). The analysis
below extends the certainty-equivalence framework of Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and
Murphy (2002) in order to examine ESO grants as a tool to lessen the potential conflict of
interest between owners of firms and their managers.  
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Risk-averse executives, rewarded mainly with fixed salaries and subject to the penalty of
job loss for failure, have no obvious incentive to take risks that are expected to be
profitable. While often associated with an alleged lack of downside risks for executives,
owing to the common misperception that no obvious losses occur when market prices fall
below exercise prices, ESOs have been seen to have a potential to induce risk taking by
executives.  They appear to have the potential to align more closely the utility functions
of executives with risk-neutral shareholders, reducing managerial conservatism in risk-
taking (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; De Fusco, Johnson and Zorn, 1990). On the other
hand, however, it has now been recognised that in-the-money or at-the-money ESOs may
lose their risk-inducing potential (Lambert et al., 1991; Carpenter, 2000). ESOs may
actually increase downside risks, and empirical results have been produced to support the
roles of ESOs in promoting both risk-taking and conservatism in risk-taking.
 
This paper addresses these differences and explains that important contingent valuations
that confront the individual executive can reconcile these chameleon-like properties of
the ESO. This paper contributes to the debate with a certainty-equivalence approach
owing to Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002). From this perspective,
mixed results can be reconciled, and new results are generated that identify the
contingencies confronting individual executives in certain industries, where different
outcomes may follow. The results suggest that the majority of modern ESO schemes in
the UK fail to tackle behaviour by top managers considered by shareholders to be
excessively cautious.  This finding corresponds with the empirical finding of  Wiseman,
McNamara and Devers (2001) of a negative relationship between share option grants and
firm risk 
In Section 2 of the paper, the Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002) model  is
utilised and extended to investigate the impact of ESOs on executive utility.  Section 3
deploys data on Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from FTSE350 firms in 1997/98 to
derive empirical estimates of these effects.  The paper concludes in section 4 with a
discussion of current government and institutional policy toward executive pay in
general, and ESOs in particular.
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2. Model
2 (i) Executives’ Valuations of Option Grants.
Following Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002), we estimate the
value of a non-tradable option to an undiversified risk-averse executive as the amount of
riskless cash compensation that the executive would exchange for the option. Before such
valuations, however, we first address the cost to the company of granting ESOs.
Adopting the Hall and Murphy (2002) framework, we consider an executive with initial
wealth w = £2 million, split between riskless cash and company shares.  Assume the
executive to receive share options with a Black-Scholes value1 of £300,000 with T = 10
years to maturity, a volatility  = 0.3 of the underlying share, and a risk-free market rate
of r = 0.055 per annum2. The Black-Scholes formula3 gives the cost to the company of the



































































































XPN  . However,
the Black-Scholes formula assumes risk-neutrality of the agent and, consequently, while
                                                     
1
  For a given share price, volatility etc., the actual number of options granted increases with the exercise
price.
2  This was the prevailing yield on 10 year government gilts at the time.
3  No dividends are considered, since, as in Hall and Murphy (2002), the incorporation of dividends does
not change qualitative results.  See Hull (1993) for formulae. Considerations of vesting restrictions,
company take-over events, executive mobility, and lack of access to a secondary market mean that the
Black-Scholes formula is only a crude approximation of the opportunity cost of ESOs to the company.
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applicable for the calculation of company cost, this formula is not accurate in the
assessment of  an executive’s valuation of the options. Due to risk aversion, one can
hypothesise that undiversified executives would value options below their Black-Scholes
value. 
Following Hall and Murphy (2002), given an executive’s initial (pre-option grant) wealth
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where, PT is the realised share price at time T, and k is the fraction of initial wealth tied
up in company shares. (Three alternatives are considered4 in the subsequent analysis,
with k = 10%, k = 20% and k = 30%.)  










The ‘certainty equivalence’ approach defines an executive’s valuation V = VS(P0, k, X)
of the option grant as the value of bonds that equates the executive’s expected utility of
wealth from the two sources )( VTWU and )( TWU  under the perceived distribution of
future share prices, f(PT):
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Following Lambert et al. (1991), subsequent analysis assumes the utility function of the























                                                     
4 Hall and Murphy (2002) utilise k = 33%, k = 50% and k = 67% but, while reasonable in the context of the
USA, these values are too high to reflect the  typical own-company equity exposure of British CEOs.
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where,  is constant relative risk-aversion5. 
We use a lognormal distribution of share prices to solve (5) for VS. This assumption of a
lognormal distribution of share prices is usual in theory and in practice, for instance the
derivation of the Black-Scholes formula is implicitly based on this assumption. Hence,
we model a distribution function f(PT) = f(PT|P0) of the share price PT at time T, given

























































The numerical solution of equation (5) for VS gives the executive’s certainty equivalent
valuation of the option grant, which is typically lower than its Black-Scholes cost.  It is
worth noting that the executive’s valuation may actually be higher than the Black-Scholes
cost when the recipient is sufficiently well diversified.  As Hall and Murphy (2002, p12)
note, this may occur owing to the executive’s valuation of the option grant reflecting the
risk premium that is incorporated in the expected shareholder return to that particular
share7 (something that is diversified away in the Black-Scholes valuation).  Of course,
most executives are sufficiently exposed to risk through holding other equity instruments
in the company that this marginal return is overwhelmed by the discounting effect of risk-
aversion.  
2(ii) The Essential Properties of Option Grants. 
                                                     
5 Recipients with  =2 and w =£2 million are indifferent between a 50% chance of an extra £300,000 and a
50% chance of nothing, and a certain £139,535.  For recipients with  =3, the certainty equivalent becomes
£134,347, and for  =4 it becomes £129,220.
6 Following the 2.55% to 4.32% estimated range in Fama and French (2001), we assume a risk premium of
3.5%.
7 This return, using the Capital Asset Pricing Model, is r = rf + β(rm-rf), where rf is the risk free rate, rm is
the market rate of return, and β is the CAPM beta. Here the risk premium, (rm-rf) is assumed to be 3.5%.
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  represents the incentive to
increase share price provided by the option grant, since it shows the change in the
certainty-equivalent value of the grant following a small change in share price, i.e. the
risk-adjusted pay-performance sensitivity of the grant. Implicit differentiation of equality













































where, WWU )('  is the first derivative of U(W) with respect to the value W of the







  of the
option grant with a Black-Scholes value of £300,000 granted to undiversified risk-averse
executives with  =4 and respectively k = 10%, 20% and 30% of initial wealth in shares.
A total initial wealth of £2million is assumed.
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Figure 1
Change in the Executive’s Valuation 
of £300,000 of Options per £1 Change in Exercise Price
     Exercise Price 
(assuming current share price = £30)
(Note: Exercise price at maximum pay-performance sensitivity is shown in Figure 1 for k=10% to
be equal to:  £20.50 (68% of share price); for k=20%, £15.40 (51% of share price); and for k=30%,
£11.50 (38% of share price)).
As can be seen, the option grant provides a lower incentive to less diversified executives
(higher k). The exercise price that maximises risk-adjusted pay-performance sensitivity
(PPS) is also lower for less diversified recipients. However, incentives are relatively
stable around the maximum, which gives the firm the ‘freedom’ to choose the exercise
price within a certain range.  With these holdings of options, when the share is ‘at the
money’, a £1 change in share price brings to the executive a change in wealth of £6,850
(k=10%), of £4,850 (k=20%) or of  £3,540 (k=30%).  As the note to Figure 1 highlights,
maximum sensitivity to performance always occurs when the options are in the money.  
Apart from the share price, the certainty-equivalent value of the option grant VS(P0,k,X)
also depends on the expected volatility, , of the underlying shares. So far, volatility has
been held at 0.3 in the analysis. Assuming that executives understand how their actions
affect share prices, we can also assume that they have beliefs about the simultaneous
effects of their actions on share price volatility. An executive’s propensity to take risks
could be measured as the share price increase that keeps executive wealth indifferent to a
∂VS/∂P
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certain increase in share price volatility. The higher the minimum price increase that the
executive would require for a certain increase in volatility, the more conservative the
executive will be in strategic decisions. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) find a positive
relationship between executive option holdings and both increased return variance and
increased company debt-equity ratio.  These findings are echoed in DeFusco et al. (1990).
On the other hand, both Lambert et al. (1991) and Carpenter (2000) argue that giving
managers more share options can cause them to reduce volatility.
Implicit differentiation of (5) with respect to variance, 2, combined with (8) gives the
risk premium which keeps the executive’s option valuation (though not total wealth)







































































Figure 2 plots the reward-risk trade-off imposed by the option granted to executives with
 = 4 and 10%, 20% and 30% of initial wealth in shares.  The vertical axis in Figure 2
indicates, for various exercise prices, the increase in share price necessary to keep an
executive’s valuation of a tranche of options constant, given a prevailing share price of
£30, when variance8 increases by 0.01.
                                                     
8 For a 0.01 increase in variance, 2, when initial assumed volatility  is 0.3, this implies that
volatility rises approximately to 0.316, which gives and increase of 0.016, or 5.4%, in volatility.
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Figure 2
The Reward-risk Trade-off resulting from a £300,000 Option Grant
(i.e., the increase in share price that keeps the executive’s value of the grant constant
under 0.01 increase in variance) (£)
    Exercise price 
(assuming current share price = £30)
(In each case these profiles have a maximum at the intercept with the vertical
axis, i.e., restricted shares.  In terms of ‘at-the-money’ options (exercise price
=£30) the reward-risk trade-off when k=10% is £1.63; when k=20%, £2.10; and
when k=30%, £2.47).
Unsurprisingly, the reward for risk taking demanded by executives (in the form of share
price appreciation) is higher for less diversified executives. It is also not surprising that
out-of-the-money options impose less conservative attitudes towards risk. It can be noted
that the reward for risk demanded by executives, being a relatively stable function for
deep in-the-money options, can fall quite significantly if exercise price is set above share
price, and this general finding does not depend on the diversification level of recipients. 
The analysis that has been undertaken to this point provides some useful qualitative
properties of the executive’s valuation of option grants. However, it is difficult to assess
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of option grants as part of the pay package
solely on the basis of these free-standing figures that relate solely changes in option
package valuations. Incentives created by option grants should be examined in the
context of the properties of the total pay package. To tackle this question, we analyse the
incentive aspects of executive pay packages with and without options (strictly, just before
and immediately after the option grant).  
∂P/∂(σ2)
13
2(iii)  The Impact of Option Grant on the Properties of the Total Pay Package.
In this section, the same certainty–equivalence framework is applied to the total
pay package before and after options are granted. Hence, this section presents the impact
of option grants on the executive’s motivations. The impact is more intuitively satisfying
than the earlier option-package-only figures since it shows the relative efficiency of
option grants as a tool deployed to mediate agency problems. The changes to the model
are minimal. We consider the same hypothetical risk-averse executive with initial wealth
w = £2million, split between riskless cash and company shares. Before the options are
granted, all pay-performance sensitivity and conservatism in decision-making comes
from the presence of company shares in the executive package. After option grant, as far
as pay-performance is concerned, options just add their rewards for price appreciation to
those of shares. However, the mixture of reward-risk trade-offs imposed by shares and by
options is not so straightforward. Options not only introduce a new trade-off, but also
impact on the existing share-derived trade-off.
In order to calculate the risk-adjusted pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS) of the entire
package, we have to amend equation (8) slightly. We are still within the same model, but
now we consider the properties of the package as a whole. Following the idea of
‘certainty equivalence’ and equation (5), we define executives’ valuations of their total
wealth Vtot as the value of riskless bonds that would have equivalent utility to the
expected utility of their total wealth. Equation (5) can, therefore, be rewritten as, 
  TTtot
T
TTTT dPPfVrUdPPfXkPPWU )())1(()()),,,(( 0  (10)
Bonds Vtot  are granted at time 0 and do not depend on the share price PT. As a result, the
equation is simplified to
))1(()()),,,(( 0 tot
T
TTTT VrUdPPfXkPPWU  (11)
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The PPS of the package is the first derivative of an executive’s valuation of the wealth






























We define executive conservatism in risk-taking as the price increase that keeps the
executive’s valuation of the total pay package unchanged after a certain increase in share
volatility. In economic terms it is the rate of substitution of two factors and is represented
by the implicit derivative RR, 























































The derivation of equation (13) is similar to that of equation (9).
Using equation (12), Figure 3 depicts a percentage increase in the PPS of the total
package after the option grant with a Black-Scholes value of £300,000. Because of the
simple additive nature of pay-performance sensitivity, Figure 3 closely resembles Figure
1.  Figure 3 emphasises, however, that the increase in the executive’s incentive to create
shareholder value in relative terms depends heavily on the overall structure of the
executive package prior to the grant, particularly on the proportion of executive wealth
tied up in company shares. Thus, other things equal, less diversified executives would be
less motivated by an option grant of a fixed Black-Scholes value both because this grant
is relatively less significant to them and because of the implied discount of its value due
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to the greater risk exposure.
Figure 3 
Increase in Total PPS of the Pay Package as a Result of the Option Grant (%)
Exercise price 
(assuming current share price = £30)
Given a share price of £30, the exercise price at which each of these loci of the
percentage change in the pay-performance sensitivity as a consequence of the adoption of
the option package has its maximum at £20.70 (69% of share price) when k=10%, at
£15.30 (51% of share price) when k=20%, and at £10.40 (35% of share price) when
k=30%.  It is worth noting that these values are very close to the corresponding values in
Figure 1. Therefore, as far as PPS is concerned, these conclusions reflect those of
Lambert et al. (1991) and Hall and Murphy (2002). Extending this line of analysis below,
we obtain a new view of the effect of options on CEOs’ risk preferences, as will be seen
later in Figure 4.
The value of the impact measure, PPS/PPS, of a tranche of share options when the
exercise price is equal to the prevailing market price of £30 can be seen in Figure 3 to be
115% (when k=10%), 52% (k=20%), and 30% (k=30%).  It is also worth noting that the
maxima in terms of PPS in these diagrams therefore always occur when the options in
question are ‘in-the-money’.  This goes against the common perception that options
∆PPS/PPS
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should be issued with challenging exercise prices and performance hurdles, and confirms
the analysis of Hall and Murphy (2002).
Figure 4 plots the impact on the reward-risk trade-off (RR/RR) as a consequence of
adopting the options package. This calculation uses the result in equation (13).  Figure 4,
then, represents the effect of the option grant on the executive’s attitude to risk.
Remembering that we define executive conservatism in risk-taking as the price increase
that keeps the executive’s valuation of the total pay package unchanged after a certain
increase in share price volatility (the reward-risk trade off, or RR), Figure 4 plots the
percentage change in executive conservatism as a result of the option grant.  
Figure 4
Effect of Option Grant on the Executive's Attitude to Risk
(Resulting change in executive conservatism in risk-taking) (%)
Exercise price 
(assuming current share price = £30)
From Figure 4, it can be seen that, with a fixed share price, the exercise price at which the
impact on the risk reward trade off is highest is £7.90 (62% of share price) for k=10%,
£7.30 (31% of share price) for k=20%, and £6.70 (19% of share price) for k=30%.
Furthermore, when the options in question are granted ‘at-the-money’ (i.e., exercise price
is equal to £30), the impact on the risk reward trade off  (RR/RR) is 26% (when
k=10%), 24% (k=20%), and 22% (k=30%).
RR/RR
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Furthermore, in terms of Figure 4, the exercise price at which there is no shift of attitude
to risk (RR/RR = 0) is £70 (233% of share price) for k=10%, £64 (213% of share price)
for k=20%, and £61 (203% of share price) for k=30%.  All of these are, of course, well
‘out of the money’.
Figure 4 also shows in fact that all in-the-money and at-the-money options increase
executive conservatism rather than decreasing it, as commonly believed. Moreover,
because of the assumed managerial risk-aversion, in-the-money options induce more
conservative attitudes to risk than restricted shares (X  = 0) with the same Black-Scholes
value. As can be seen, for the option grant to reduce excessively cautious executive
behaviour, exercise price should be much higher than the current share price (about twice
as high as share price under our assumptions). Under most executive option schemes,
however, options have been granted at-the-money. Therefore, the model suggests that the
majority of modern option schemes do nothing to tackle the cautious behaviour of top
managers and, if anything, cause them to be even more cautious. This theoretical
conclusion corresponds with the empirical finding of Wiseman et al. (2001) of a negative
relationship between share option grants and firm risk.           
We now turn to empirical estimates of the various effects analysed above. 
3. Results
Using data collected for 1997/98 on companies in the FTSE350 (see Buck et al., 2003),
estimates are computed for each of the 204 non-financial companies that were found to
be operating an active ESO scheme9.  The key executive is the CEO, and for this person
it is possible to measure base salary plus bonus pay, holdings of ESOs and holdings of
other equity-related instruments such as company shares and long term incentive plans
                                                     
9 Out of initial 350 companies, 46 financial companies and a further 70 companies not operating
option schemes were excluded.  A further 24 companies were dropped because of data
availability arising from incidents such as de-listings and mergers. Finally, we excluded 6 more
companies owing to CEO duplication in change-over periods.
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(LTIPs) as recorded in the relevant 1998 company annual report.  A distinctive feature of
this paper is that interim valuations of ESOs and LTIPs are estimated, in the sense that
they include estimates of the value of ESOs before exercise and of LTIPs before final
pay-out.  This produces a unique and comprehensive data set.
The Minimum Assumed Incentive Effect (MAI effect) is computed as the Black-Scholes
valuation of the option holdings10 by using equation (5) to value the certainty equivalent
valuation of option holdings given the executive’s other equity holdings and the level of
pay11 that is invariant with share price.  The Black-Scholes valuation is then computed
using equations (1) and (2) and the difference between the two valuations provides our
measure of MAI effect.  Further detail is available in Appendix A.
The histogram in Figure 5 describes the sample outcomes, which can be seen to cover a
wide range12, as the fraction by which the Black-Scholes value exceeds the certainty
equivalent value, expressed as (B-S-cost - Risk-adjusted-value) / Base Pay.
                                                     
10 It is well known that even if valuing the opportunity cost of ESOs to the company, the Black-
Scholes formula has some limitations in the sense that the executive may leave the company, the
company may be taken over and the options rendered void (unlikely in practice), there is
invariably a vesting period (usually three years), and the options are non-tradable.  But, for the
purposes of contrasting the cost of ESOs to the company with the value of options received by
executives, these complications are ignored here.
11 This is used as a guide to the total wealth of the executive – a minimum value of £1million is
ascribed. This risk-free part of the CEO’s wealth, which we denote (1-k)w, is estimated to be the
greater of £1 million or 4 times annual cash compensation. Annual cash compensation is, in turn,
estimated on the basis of the company’s annual report for 1997-98 as (salary + 0.8 x bonus +
benefits).  LTIPs and other forms of CEO holdings of the firm’s shares are all included in kw –
which is the fraction of the CEO’s wealth tied up in the company shares.
12 Note, that it is possible for this value to be negative.  While this may appear perverse it merely
reflects an overly diversified executive with a weakly equity–oriented portfolio, see Hall and
Murphy (2002, p8).
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The mean value is 1.22, which suggests that the average minimum assumed incentive
effect (MAI effect) is some 122% of base salary.  Some 90% of observations lie between
0.1% and 575% and the median value is 48%.  With very high values13 of the MAI effect,
it is clear that the company expects the incentive alignment effect to produce substantial
gains in terms of shareholder value.  Figure 5 assumes that all managers have the same
level of risk-aversion (ρ = 4), which is evidently a simplification of reality. If we allow
for different levels of risk-aversion among managers it would probably result in higher
peaks and fewer outliers in Figure 5 because of managerial turnover and the self-selection
properties of the labour market.  
The risk-adjusted Wealth-Performance-Elasticity (WPE), is calculated14 using the wealth
                                                     
13 There were four CEOs with values in excess of 700%, namely, Ashtead, Corporate Services,
Sage, and Rentokil Initial
14 To be specific, Figure 6 plots [WPS * share price / annual cash compensation] and represents
Figure 5. Minimum assumed incentive effect of FTSE350 
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performance sensitivity from equation (12) and is shown in Figure 6. This indicates a
substantial range of values calculated for our sample of CEOs. The mean value of the
WPE shown here is 0.39, with 90% of values falling in the range 0.09 to 0.83.  Thus, the
median value is 0.33.  The wealth of the median CEO increases by 0.33% for every
1.00% increase in share price.  It would appear, therefore, that for most executives in this
sample, the sensitivity of remuneration to company performance is more modest than one
might have expected, although there are some notable outliers15.  At the median, the
result is consistent with that found in the landmark study by Conyon and Murphy (2000,
p658), which reported a median elasticity of 0.25 for the UK.










                                                                                                                                                             
wealth-performance elasticity. WPS is computed based on equation (10) at the end of 1997/98









15 There are two companies with WPE greater then 1: Pillar Property, with CEO P. Vaughan, and
Shell Transport and Trading, with CEO and Chairman M. Moody-Stuart. Among those with WPE
close to 1 are founders of their companies or CEOs with significant shareholdings and low share
price volatility: K Morrison, CEO and Chairman of Morrison (WM) Supermarket, P. Walker, CEO
of Sage, and N. Wray, CEO and Chairman of Burford Holdings.
Figure 6. Risk-adjusted elasticity of total wealth to 
performance for FTSE350 CEOs in the financial year end 













  The Reward-Risk trade-off (RR) computes the percentage increase in share price
necessary to compensate the executive for a 1 % increase in risk (as measured by the
variance in share price) and is shown in Figure 7.   Figure 7 plots RR elasticity, where RR
is computed based on equation (13), at the end of the 1997/98 financial year16. Therefore,
Figure 7 represents RR for options in elasticity terms (percentage increase of share price
that would off-set 1% increase in variance). 
 
 The mean RR value is 0.37 with 90% of values lying between 0.02 and 0.87.  It is
interesting to note that there are nine CEOs with negative estimated values in Figure 7.
These are the CEOs whose risk-adjusted valuation of options increases in value if
                                                     




















Figure 7. Executive conservatism in risk taking (RR tot) 
imposed by option and shareholdings (% increase in share 















uncertainty grows. For the rest of the sample, the risk-adjusted valuation of options
decreases with share price volatility. The median value is 0.32, which suggests that CEOs
do not require particularly large relative improvements in share price to compensate for
taking additional risk - a 0.32% increase in share price to compensate for a 1.00%
increase in variance at the median.
The person with the maximum relative RR of options is BTG’s CEO, Mr. I. Harvey. He
has an estimated relative RR of 1.77 which means that a 1.77% increase in share price is
necessary to maintain the value of his options for every 1.00% increase in variance17.   
Figures 5 through 7 are informative and suggest a wide range of practice in pay design
and resulting MAI effects across UK companies.  It is particularly interesting to note, in
Figure 7, that the overwhelming effect of share option schemes is to discourage the
taking of risk by CEOs as it indicates that a predominantly positive increase in share
price is necessary to off-set a one percent increase in the variance if share price.  This is
investigated further in Figure 9 and in Tables 1 and 2 below.
In an attempt to bring out the impact of the options packages on CEO incentives, we now
examine the change in WPE (Figure 8) and the change in the RR sensitivity (Figure 9)
that can be ascribed to the ESO packages the executives are seen to be holding.
                                                     
17 At BTG, CEO Mr. I. Harvey in 1998 enjoyed: Base pay of £194,123; 567,633 shares at £6.755
each; options with a B-S cost of £394,000, and a risk-adjusted value of £18,000. We see that he
discounts his option holdings almost by a factor of 22 according to our model, which could
obviously mean that he perceives a great risk burden. Unsurprisingly, BTG share price standard
deviation is 0.58 and is among the highest in the sample.
23
 
Using the expression derived in equation (12) for the impact of the option package on
wealth-performance sensitivity, Figure 8 illustrates the impact of observed holdings of
ESOs on the CEOs in the sample.  From Figure 8, the mean value is 0.45 (the median is
also 0.45), with 90% of observations falling between 0.02 and 0.90.  Thus, on average,
option grants contribute 45% of total wealth-performance sensitivity, and 90% of
observed holdings of option contribute between 2.1% and 90% of WPE.  The remainder
comes form holding equity and LTIPs.  
Figure 8. Share of wealth-performance elasticity 
contributed by option grants 
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Figure 9 uses equation (13) to present the impact of observed option packages on the
sensitivity of the executive to embrace company risk.  This is measured here by providing
the difference between the estimate of what the required price/volatility trade-off is with
the option package present net of what it would be were that package to be absent.  A
positive value therefore suggests that the option package is causing executives to be more
sensitive to company risk.  As can be seen in Figure 9, the mean value is 0.03 (the
median is 0.02), with 90% of values falling between –0.12 and 0.23.  This means that, on
average, option grants increase managerial conservatism in risk taking by an additional
0.03 which constitutes roughly one-tenth of the median managerial conservatism of 0.32.
However, in 78 cases out of an observed 204, those 38.2% of the sample who lie to the
left of zero in Figure 9, the value of ( RRtot – RRshares ) is negative and total option grants
actually manage to decrease managerial conservatism in investment appraisals. 
The 126 cases, where options seem to provide an additional risk burden and provide an
additional incentive to make cautious executive decisions, support the views of both
Lambert et al. (1991) and Carpenter (2000).   That said, however, for some CEOs (the 78
out of 204 who lie to the left of zero in Figure 9) there is support for the view of Agrawal
and Mandelker (1987) and DeFusco et al. (1990) that ESOs promote corporate risk-
taking behaviour. 
Change in reward-risk sensitivity
 
Figure 9. Effect of option tranches on executive's attitude to  
risk (Resulting change in executive conservatism in risk-taking):  







-0.25 -0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65
Change in reward-risk sensitivity 
Fraction 
25
Further detail is provided in Tables 1 and 2.  These summarise, by quartile, the various
incentive effects of the equity components of executive pay as recorded in the sample of
CEOs taken from the FTSE350 companies.  We concentrate on Table 1, which divides
the sample by the relative importance of the assumed incentive effect of ESOs expressed
as a fraction of base pay.  Table 2 repeats this analysis but defines the quartiles in terms
of the opportunity cost of the option package (at Black-Scholes values).  
In Table 1, column 3 is based on equation (1) and indicates the spread of the cost of the
options packages being held.  These vary from the low-quartile value of £103k to the
upper quartile value of £1,983k.  The corresponding risk-adjusted values are given in
column 4 (from equation 5) and range from £75k to £563k respectively.  More
importantly, column 5 reports the wealth-performance elasticities, and column 6
describes the percentage of this attributable to ESOs.  The relative importance of ESOs is
around 36% to 53%, with the rest of the incentive effect coming from executives’
shareholdings and LTIP schemes.  But the size of the effect, reflecting the absolute level
of use of these components, varies widely.  At the upper quartile, some £1,983k of equity
instruments are held with an effective certainty equivalent value of £563k, this leaving an
implied £1,420k of value to be produced by the incentive effect.  The corresponding risk-
adjusted wealth-performance elasticity is 0.62.  
Column 7 reports the median values of the reward-risk trade-off, and shows that, with a
move to a higher assumed incentive effect (generally, executives with a heavier
preponderance of options and equity in their remuneration package), the required share
price appreciation in return for higher volatility increases.  Furthermore, Column 8
indicates that only in the bottom quartile does the equity aspect of the remuneration
package induce risk-taking behaviour, in the sense that immediately exercising all option
holdings would increase the CEO’s risk burden and would leave the CEO’s wealth more
vulnerable to market uncertainty.  Hence, only for CEOs in the bottom quartile do options
moderate conservatism in risk taking.  In the other three quartiles, the presence of
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executive share options increases the required share appreciation in return for higher
assumption of risk (makes them more conservative). This result is obtained by using
equations (11) and (13) respectively before and after the assumption that all options have
been exercised and sold.  Column 8 then compares the price-risk trade-off with and
without options through the ratio:  (RRshares only – RRtot)/( RRtot) .
Table 3 reports the results of a simple regression that explores two hypotheses. The first
hypothesis is that company costs associated with ESO grants are, at least in part, paid off
by enhanced future performance of the company brought about by improved alignment in
managerial incentives. The second hypothesis relates to the relationship between the
extent of executive conservatism and the firm’s future performance. It is argued here that
excessively cautious executives may negatively affect company performance. In order to
test for these hypotheses, a one-year lag was assumed.  the industry-adjusted total
shareholder returns were collected for the year (1998/99) following the incentive pay
valuations and regressed on our measures of the MAI effect (as in Figure 5) and
executive conservatism (RRshares, as in Figure 7) both measured at 1997/98. 
Table 3 suggests that controlling for the risk conservatism effect, the more faith
companies have in ESOs (as manifested by a higher MAI effect) the more positive is
subsequent company performance. This lends support to our first hypothesis.
The statistically significant negative estimate for the relationship between executive
conservatism (RR) and subsequent total shareholder return, reported in Table 3, is
consistent with our second hypothesis. Executives whose remuneration packages incline
them to place a high price on additional company risk, are associated with poorer
company performance in the subsequent period.  Thus, the empirical results tentatively
suggest that relatively cautious executives negatively affect company performance.
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4. Discussion 
Company executives are argued to be relatively undiversified, especially since boards
usually impose significant ownership requirements on executives in line with the
conventional wisdom of aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders. To
keep executives’ rewards dependent on company share price, various time restrictions on
hedging company shares and trading in such options generally apply to executive pay
packages. As a result, it is not only the human capital of managers (including reputation
in the managerial labour market, see Fama (1980)) that is heavily dependent on company
performance, but much of their financial capital as well. Under these circumstances, risk-
averse managers are sometimes argued to be more conservative with respect to risk-
taking than well-diversified outside shareholders would prefer them to be. 
Nevertheless, it is often assumed that option grants increase managerial risk-taking since
they reward share price appreciation in full and impose only limited, albeit non-trivial,
penalties for falling share price. However, there is only weak support for this logic from
empirical studies. Indeed, Wiseman et al. (2001) find a negative relationship between the
share option wealth of CEOs and measures of firm risk. A possible explanation is that
options deep in-the-money lose their risk-inducing potential and converge on shares from
the incentive property perspective. More generally, as Hall and Murphy (2002) point out,
even options granted at-the-money may have a negative effect on risk-taking if the
executive is heavily undiversified. It is argued here that the effect of option grants on
managerial attitudes to risk needs more careful analysis in order to derive implications for
the design of ESO plans. 
The results reported above lend some support to those who suggest that option grants do
not decrease conservatism in risk taking, with the majority of CEOs in our FTSE350
sample  (126 out of 204) being in a situation where options, and certainly additional
options, seem to provide an additional risk burden and hence induce further cautious
behaviour as suggested by both Lambert et al. (1991) and Carpenter (2000).   On the
other hand, for some CEOs (78 out of 204) there is support for the view of Agrawal and
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Mandelker (1987) and DeFusco et al. (1990) that ESOs promote corporate risk-taking
behaviour.  At the very least, the evidence presented above seems to support the view of
Yermack (1995) that option policy is not always well thought out or planned by
companies in terms of tackling agency problems.  That said, however, the results
presented here can be encompassed by the approach of Core and Guay (1999), who use
an optimising framework but allow for transitory out of equilibrium positions to arise.
What does emerge clearly in the basic regression of Table 3 is that there are indications
that companies that place their faith in the incentive effect of ESOs do reap the reward of
higher company performance.  Those companies where executives had options packages
with a higher minimum assumed incentive effect (MAI effect) in 1997/98, as measured as
a proportion of their base pay, were indeed seen to record higher industry-adjusted
shareholder returns in the following financial year.  On the other hand, companies where
executives held a higher price on risk were associated with lower shareholder return in
the following year.
In terms of the MAI effect itself, Figure 5 shows that some 80% of firms are operating in
the range of up to two times base pay.  The wealth to performance elasticity in the sample
of 204 firms is shown in Figure 6, and has a  median value of 0.33, slightly higher but
consistent with the Conyon and Murphy (2000) result of 0.25.  Figure 7 shows that, for
almost all executives in the sample, additional ESOs could induce less rather than more
risk taking in their company decisions.  This is balanced somewhat, by the results of
Figure 9 where it can be seen that the option package as a whole has the effect of
reducing the barriers to risk taking (at least in 78 of the 204 executives examined).  For
the remaining 126 executives, however, the executive share options move the executives
to a more conservative position.
The analysis presented above develops and extends the work of Lambert et al. (1991) and
of Hall and Murphy (2002).  Possible future extensions would involve considering the
effect of the option grant on the total pay package over the whole option term rather than
simply looking, as above, at its impact in a single cross section of data. The expected
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trajectory of share prices introduces expectations into the executive’s valuation of options
in years 2,..,T as well as expectations of incentives that can be different from incentives
at year 1. It would be rational for the company, therefore, to include these expectations in
its considerations and to solve the problem of incentive optimisation not just at the time
of the grant but for the whole option term. But, even within the confines of the present
analysis, it is felt that this approach through the MAI effect offers insights to executive
pay that have previously eluded analysis.
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Appendix A
One complication confronted in the data is the fact that individual CEOs in the data
collected as at 1998 have up to six different option tranches.  A literal implementation of
the theory developed above would lead to six-fold integrals, and the consequent empirical
calculations would be prohibitively time consuming.  To simplify matters, a degree of
aggregation is undertaken. 
In aggregating, however, it is necessary to recognise that one should not aggregate two
very different (with respect to time to maturity) option tranches.  For example, the risk -
adjusted valuation of a one 1-year option and a 9-year option (both of the same exercise
price) is not equal to the risk adjusted valuation of two 5-year options, because of
different degrees of uncertainty attached to these options. The effective ‘discount rate’
which risk-averse recipients apply to options varies with the option term and this effect is
further complicated due to the essential nonlinearity of the utility function. 
In order to minimise any possible aggregation errors while maintaining computational
tractability, for individual CEOs we aggregate all their option tranches into two groups,
with time to maturity T1 and T2, T1< T2. We assume that executives lock in all of the
realised gain of the shorter option grant at the expiration moment T1 and enjoy the risk-
free interest rate ‘r’ on this gain for the remainder of the period (T2-T1).  With two option
tranches the analysis is as follows.
Assuming an initial wealth of w, the executive’s wealth at time T2 can be modelled as: 












P0, PT1, PT2 – realised share price at time 0, T1, T2; 
T1, T2 – terms of two option grants T1<T2;
m1, m2 – correspondent quantity of options in the option grants;
X1, X2 – exercise price of options of the first and second grant correspondingly. 
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As mentioned above, the form of WT2 assumes that the executive locks in all of the
realised gain of the shorter option grant at the expiration moment T1 and enjoys risk-free
interest rate r on this gain for the rest of the period  (T2-T1). As before, the award of
riskless bonds V instead of options would leave the executive with wealth:









































The numerical solution of equation LHS = RHS for VS gives the executive’s valuation of
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Risk-adjusted Incentives and Minimum Assumed Incentive Effect
(1)
Minimum assumed
incentive effect MAIE =
 (B-S value – risk-adj.
















































51 103 75 0.18 53 % 0.11 + 10.0 %
0.166 < MAIE < 0.482 51 313 184 0.33 50 % 0.26 - 6.4 %
0.482 < MAIE <1.170 51 613 240 0.37 42 % 0.38 -11.5 %
MAIE > 1.170
(high company cost)
51 1,983 563 0.62 36 % 0.55 -7.0 %
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TABLES 1 and 2 notes:
Where:
Column
1. variable used to create the quartiles
2. number of observations falling within each quartile
3. median B-S value of option grants held by executive, in £ thousands
4. median risk-adjusted value of option grants, in £ thousands
5. median risk-adjusted wealth-performance elasticity (WPE) of all holdings (shares + options)Example: in the fourth quartile in the Table 1,
WPE = 0.62 which means that median CEO’s wealth of these firms grows by 0.62% with every 1% increase in share price the fraction of
the WPE that is generated by option holdings 
6. relative effect of exercising option holdings on WPE.
7. median risk-reward (RR) trade-off of the CEOs’ total wealth imposed by share- and option holdings. Serves as a proxy for the CEO’s
conservatism in risk-taking.  Example: in the fourth quartile in Table 1, RR = 0.55 means that the negative effect of a 1% increase in share
price variance on the CEOs’ total wealth can be off-set by 0.55 % increase in share price. 
8. Relative effect of exercising option holdings on RR. If this figure is positive, the ESOs act to reduce the CEO’s conservatism in risk-taking.
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Table 2. 
Risk-adjusted Incentives and the Company Opportunity Cost of Options
(1)
Company opportunity cost of
options = 

















(for a whole sample





























51 90 62 0.18 52 % 0.12 +5.0 %
£65,000 < Cost < £202,500 51 296 207 0.34 46 % 0.24 -7.0 %
£202,500 < Cost <£519,000 51 595 211 0.36 45 % 0.38 -10.8 %
Cost >£519,000
(high company cost)
51 2,175 680 0.62 41 % 0.55 -11.7 %
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Table 3 
Explanatory Regression for Next Year’s Industry-Adjusted Total Shareholder Return
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable = Industry-adjusted TSR for 1998/99 fiscal year








F(2,201) statistic/ prob. Value 6.14 (0.003)
Adj. R2 .06
Mean of dependent variable -.0248
N Obs. 204
